Not only that but he also points out that Iraq had imported 17 larger “hydrogen generators” with a much higher capacity. Being a red neck I see people but one thing to scavenge parts for another thing all the time. After Clinton’s article and now this it’s fairly clear that whatever Iraq was doing they weren’t too keen on sharing information. I have a few quotes (one from each section) below but I suggest you go read the entire post as it’s very detailed.

SEIXON : Thought I would pass along the news that Iraq imported over a dozen hydrogen generators right up until the Iraq war that had twice the production rate of the supposed hydrogen carriages.

The ISG bought into the hydrogen production story mostly due to documents provided by the Director General of the Al Kindi State Company. On 4 June 2003, a week after the CIA and DIA published their report claiming the trailers to be BW facilities, he sent a dossier of 12 documents to the American Authority in Mosul. One listed the 10 people who had worked on the trailers and other supporting documents that seemed to show a contract from the Republican Guard to produce the vehicles.

With these facts, which have most likely never been revealed until now, it would seem that Dr. David Kay may have been more right than wrong in suggesting the notion of hydrogen production to have been a rather silly one.....(continued in extended entry)

........Why would the Iraqis go to so much trouble to fabricate large, inefficient, road-bound hydrogen generators when they already had access to and could order smaller, efficient, portable systems? In fact, the Iraqis were importing and ordering hydrogen generators far more suitable for their needs while building the trailers. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Iraqis had no reason to create these systems to produce hydrogen, and evaded UN inspection of these vehicles, with a cover story on the shelf in case they were ever found.

Are the trailers capable of producing hydrogen? Sure, without a doubt. Were they “built exclusively” for that purpose? This is yet another example of a dual-use setup, or in fact, possibly a multi-use setup. A plausible usage is established, while an ulterior one is the reality. What couldn’t Iraq import? What would they want to keep hidden from inspections? What would they use so much effort to create? Just as a nuclear program can be used for both power and nuclear weapons, it is obvious that hydrogen is not the only substance this system can produce. The key to the mystery may be the facility where they were produced: the Al Kindi Research, Testing, Development and Engineering Facility.

Curiously absent from the Duelfer report assessment of the trailers is any mention of what the Al Kindi facility actually is – which eerily haunts the rest of the omissions from the report. The facility is Iraq’s largest missile development site, home of the infamous Al Samoud 2 missiles that Saddam fought to keep, but eventually agreed to destroy. Why was a missile development site producing hydrogen generators for weather balloons? Weren’t there more important things to do in the run-up to the looming possibility of war?

Posted by: Howie at 10:00 AM | Comments (8) | Add Comment
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