Most media outlets have been telling us that Zarqawi was fingered through good detective work in and around Baghdad. Stratfor has a different take. It claims that Zarqawi's head was something of a "peace offering" from the Sunni establishment to the Shia elites:

The political explanation is supported by two facts. The first is that within minutes of al-Zarqawi's death being publicly verified, the final positions in the Iraqi Cabinet were filled. The second is that almost immediately after al-Zarqawi went down, some 17 other sites were raided, and even more were raided after that. We doubt that the intelligence gathered at the scene of the first strike could be interpreted that quickly and an operation mounted that fast. That means that whoever passed intelligence to the United States had a lot of intelligence to pass. Al-Zarqawi kept things compartmentalized; he was a professional. So either the head of his operations turned, on his own, or someone above him who had a lot of information did. We think it is the latter.

Assuming that there is at least some truth to Stratfor's conjecture as to how the facts actually played out behind closed doors, why would the Sunni establishment eliminate one of its most useful tools? According to Stratfor:

The Sunnis realized that their political position meant they no longer required the "services" of the jihadists -- who were not under Sunni control, though the Sunnis allowed them to operate on Iraqi soil and were able to exploit their actions. The situation regarding negotiations had also reached a point at which the Sunnis had to demonstrate their worth and good faith -- hence the delivery of al-Zarqawi.

Giving up the jihadists not only advanced the Sunnis' position, it also allowed them to avoid having to scale back the insurgency as a whole. The Sunni political leaders do not want to be targeted by both Shiite militiamen and jihadists angry over their betrayal, and thus do not want to give up the insurgency until the Sunnis have security guarantees from the Shia.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Zarqawi may support the notion of a political detente between previously unreconciled Shiite and Sunni factions. Though some suggest Zarqawi was sold out by an erstwhile compatriot and that his death may lead to political progress, there's some reason to believe his death may have been the result of a political accomodation rather than the cause of it. That, as Stratfor argues, "his betrayal was the result of a political decision by senior Sunni politicians who had used al-Zarqawi in their insurrection, knew where he was and gave him away."

If Zarqawi's death was merely the death of one terrorist, albeit a prolific one, then it's of relatively little strategic value. If Zarqawi's death was the result of a Sunni buy-in to the political process, then it is monumentally important.

However the game may ultimately play out, nothing can diminish the excellent work of the personnel who took Zarqawi out. A sociopathic monster is dead, and the rest of the world owes a big, collective "thank you" to the folks who did us all the favor.

Posted by: Kos_Irhabi at 02:53 PM | Comments (7) | Add Comment
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