In this fascinating article at the Jamestown Foundation, Michael Scheuer analyzes the strategic writings of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia leader Abu Hajar Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin. It seems that al-Muqrin has given a lot of thought to the "long war" against the United States--yes, al-Muqrin apparently is in agreement with the Bush Administration that this will be a long and protracted war.

The following is an analysis of the evolving tactics of al Qaeda and their "grand strategy" for winning the war against the U.S. The model proposed by al-Muqrin is one of sporadic irregular warfare which gradually intesifies:

He wrote that the war would progress slowly through such phases as initial manpower mobilization, political work among the populace to establish trust and support, the accumulation of weaponry and other supplies, the establishment of bases around the country and especially in the mountains, the initiation of attacks on individuals and then a gradual intensification of the latter until a countrywide insurgency was underway.

At this point, al-Muqrin argues, the U.S. and its allies will be unwilling to use large-scale attacks to root out the insurgency--we are just too afraid of the civilian casualties it might cause. Instead of pro-actively seeking out our enemies, we focus, instead, on force protection. That is, we are less worried about winning the war than we are about not losing any more casualties.

So far has al-Muqrin not precisely described the progression of our fight against Islamist terror? It seems that al Qaeda understands us far better than the New York Times, al-Qaeda's unwitting ally.

What next?

At this point, al-Muqrin wrote, the mujahideen could begin the final stage of preparation for victory, "which is building a military force across the country that becomes the nucleus of a military army."

As the U.S. retreats, al Qaeda moves into the vacuum:

"the mujahideen will set up administrative centers and basesÂ…They will build camps, hospitals, Sharia courts and radio transmission stations at these areas, which will serve as a staging area for their military and political operations."

"The reason the mujahideen should target the small cities is that when the enemies' soldiers see these [small] cities falling into the hands of the mujahideen it will destroy their morale and they will realize that they are no match for the mujahideen."

It would be useful for U.S. policymakers to understand the Grand Strategy of al Qaeda. These are not stupid people we are fighting. They are committed ideologues unconstrained by modern sensibilities about the limits of civilized warfare.

Posted by: Rusty at 03:07 PM | Comments (14) | Add Comment
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