By Demosophist

I've been thinking lately about the process of nation-building in Iraq and elsewhere, under the difficult conditions imposed by a vicious terrorist insurgency. The prospects for the enterprise sometimes seem as likely as the quest for the Philosopher's Stone, the mythical device that was supposed to turn "dross into gold." Somehow the transfer of legitimacy from an occupying power to a new liberal democratic government, in a recently totalitarian society, seems just as implausible, and valuable. Recently I compared this bit of alchemy to a famous cycling contest, between American Lance Armstrong and Italian Marco Pantani, up the slopes of the bleak and legendary Mont Ventoux. Cycling is such a rich mix of competition and cooperation that it often supplies useful analogies for political processes, and this particular contest seemed appropriate because it involved an attempt by Armstrong to "render the victory" to another rider, in order to obtain cooperation of that rider's team in a larger strategy. The attempt was unsuccessful for a number of reasons. In the context of establishing a new nation victories attributable that nation's fledgling military forces confer badly needed legitimacy on the new government. For instance, a critical turning point for the United States occurred when it defeated the British in the "Second American Revolution," during the War of 1812. (We don't emphasize the fact that our role in that war was rather minor, or that we experienced a number of ignoble defeats, as well as one astounding and unlikely victory.) But if this victory's contribution to the modest stock of political/social legitimacy of the new United States was so formative, imagine the "legitimacy problem" confronted by a nation that owes its very existence to an external liberating power. The cycling analogy works reasonably well as an introduction to the essential difficulty of passing legitimacy from a greater to a lesser power, but it fails, ironically, because it actually overstates the problem. In fact it remains useful as an analytical tool not so much because it's a good analogy, but because it fails in a relatively well-defined way. That failure focuses attention on some extremely important aspects of the nation-building process.

Although many of the differences between a bike race and a nation-building effort are obvious, they aren't necessarily non-trivial. It isn't especially important to the utility that one is a sporting event and the other a war strategy, because we already understand those implications well. It's enough that both are contests, with opponents and alliances. It's also not terribly important that one is a contest between individuals, and the other groups. Again, it's enough that both individuals and groups are capable of conflict as well as cooperation. But two aspects of the analogy bear significantly on the comparison: The definitive and brief nature of the finish, and the necessarily obvious proximity of the finishers.

First, the finish in a bike race, or almost any sort of sport race for that matter, is measured in hundredths or even thousandths of a second. It is therefore both definitive and brief in a way only slightly exceeded by ballistics analysis, computer electronics design, or advanced particle physics experimentation. More importantly, as the contestants approach the finish the subjective stakes for the riders and their supporters ramps like a tsunami approaching a shallow coastline. During the long climb up Mont Ventoux (an ascent so difficult it is considered "beyond categorization" or hors categorie) the interests of both cyclists are served cooperation as well as competition, because two riders of closely matched ability not only provide one another with incentive to give their best effort, but riding in a close line gives them a combined aerodynamic advantage not achieved by a lone rider. (This combined advantage diminishes at lower speeds typical of a steep climb for most mortals, but pro riders still climb at speeds where aerodynamic drag is a factor.) However, at the finish of Mont Ventoux after the long and arduous duel up the mountain and the abrupt approach of the denouement, it became nearly impossible to mollify Pantani's sense of disgrace when Armstrong relented at the last instant to allow the stage victory to the Italian. It was all too obvious to Pantani's fans, let alone the rider himself, that he was the inferior contestant on that day. The disgrace overwhelmed and spoiled any implied goodwill, and instead of inducing an alliance, as intended, the gesture turned sour. The Italian was livid, and vented furiously in the press the next day. He later dropped out of the race entirely. (Some have argued that this result was intended by Armstrong, but I see no evidence for that. Pantani was not competitive for the overall lead, and with his team he might easily have been a useful ally.)

Any attempt to similarly bequeath Iraqi victories must, therefore, avoid any hint of the sort of transparent gesture that enraged Pantani, because the "fans" of a new government are everything. If they see their new state as merely a puppet of the US, dependent on American support for its very survival, the new nation won't survive independently for very long. At best it will be a "hot house" colony. But if those who are ruled have faith in their government and its institutions, the nation may endure some very difficult trials on its own. Fortunately, unlike a sport race the finish of a nation-building effort is not only indeterminate but prolonged. It can drag on for months or years, and involves many turning points. It therefore offers "opportunities for alchemy."

Another important aspect of the bike race, for comparison, is that it was necessary for Armstrong to engineer a close stage finish in order to optimize his overall lead in the multi-stage tour, which was his real objective. A rider finishing a stage within what is considered the aerodynamic "wake" of a leading contestant receives the same time as the winner, and the overall lead for the multi-stage contest is entirely a matter of the time accumulated over many stages. This meant that the American could not afford to allow Pantani to take a sufficiently commanding lead that it would have been a convincing stage victory for him. (Nor would it have been useful to do so, for Armstrong.) Although Pantani was not a serious overall contender, others were. The Texan therefore had to finish in as brief a time as possible. Yet, if Pantani could manage to hang on or stay close, or better yet actually help, Lance wasn't averse to rewarding the cooperation by allowing the other rider to cross the line first, to stand on the winner's platform for a day. Ultimately, although some of these circumstances suggested the possibility of enlisting Pantani as an ally, others made such an objective extremely difficult, if not impossible. To work, the gesture had to be sufficiently obvious to be recognized by Pantani and his team, but not so palpable as to be, well... embarrassing. Armstrong has since stated that he will never again attempt such a gesture, and has not done so.

Again, what we're doing in Iraq is building a vanguard for democracy in the heart of the Arab Middle East in order to oppose the enemy's own vanguard. (For a good elucidation of the enemy's strategy see Mary Habek's Heritage Foundation lecture: Jihadist Strategies in the War on Terrorism, or the video archive of the same.) So maintaining an ally is a critical part of our objective, not merely a secondary opportunity. The last thing we want is to enrage or demoralize the new nation's "fans," or undermine their faith in the enterprise. But fortunately, unlike the contest between the Texan and the Italian, there is no real need for the US forces to cross the finish line at all. Our "reward" is the success of the new Iraqi nation, not our own. Our stock of legitimacy is rather substantial after more than 200 years. While it's true that we need to avoid the appearance of defeat in order to deter potential adversaries, there is no real need to claim the final stage of the military victory as our own. We can afford to let the Iraqis reap that reward convincingly.

The finish in Iraq will ultimately be governed by two interrelated trends. The first is the growing competence of the domestic security force together with public confidence in the national institutions it represents (including, in this case, the direct transfer of Ayatollah Sistani's personal charismatic legitimacy). The second is the waning capability and spoiling effort of the opposing insurgency, and if possible its catastrophic loss of legitimacy. Obviously this is a far more complex scenario than a bike race, but ironically it's not correspondingly more difficult to manage. In fact the very complexity of the scenario renders the task of nation-building somewhat more manageable. Furthermore, the two "finish trends" aren't quite mirror images in terms of predictability, and this can be turned to advantage as well.

While the two trends are related and similar, control of the learning curve for the defense forces (the police, National Guard, etc.) is far more reliable than the enemy's actions. The training of the domestic security force is characterized by relatively small or incremental day to day ups and downs, while the insurgent capability is characterized by relatively high variability, and corresponding uncertainty. Still, over time each trend will tend to be the inverse of the other. As the Iraqis become more competent the mujahadeen will become more stressed and less effective. At a certain point the frequency and intensity of the insurgency's attacks will become largely manageable by domestic security, assuming both a successful training program and military strategy/tactics. But the US role in achieving this result can remain largely obscured from the "fans" of the domestic force, ironically by the relative unpredictability of the insurgency's actions. The uncertainty of both its successes and failures are actually an advantage. We can think of the variability of the latter function or trend as providing a certain amount of "cover" for the transition, during which the precise role of the US contribution will become increasingly obscure. And victories obtained by the domestic force during this period provide the primary means of transferring legitimacy from the occupying force to the domestic force, and to the institutions of the new nation.

It is therefore the very uncertainty of asymmetric warfare, usually considered one of its primary strengths, that provides the most reliable means for the mystique-laden transfer of national legitimacy and the consolidation of sovereignty that is the core of this particular form of "alchemy." By gradually bringing the insurgency under control we are progressively employing the enemy's strengths against its own long term objectives. In a sense we are enlisting the enemy in the service of the ally, and it's precisely the advantage of this sort of practical irony that's the real "secret" behind the Philosopher's Stone's power.

Posted by: Demosophist at 06:55 PM | Comments (17) | Add Comment
Post contains 1835 words, total size 12 kb.

1 two questions 1. was this your dissertation? 2, was it approved? You know how to wear a dumb exJarhead out! My eyes hurt. We have been, are and will win the War on Terror. Have faith

Posted by: Rod Stanton at March 06, 2005 06:48 AM (l5t6M)

2 Rod: But did you like the title?

Posted by: Demosophist at March 06, 2005 08:31 AM (Dfdj0)

3 OK I liked the title. I read the entire thing and you owe me for a new set of glasses. The title inttrigued me.

Posted by: Rod Stanton at March 06, 2005 08:07 PM (l5t6M)

4 Didn't Nietzche say something along the lines of "only a fool muddies his water?" 1) You state the obvious when you make the theoretical comment that Iraq will be able to handle itself when it has a population that supports its government and that (in theory) their military will be able to overcome the insurgency once they are better trained. Also, if there's anything we've learned in the last 30 years is that you can't apply western rationality in determining what will happen in the Middle East. Also, a bike race analogy (or any analogy) wasn't really necessary, and likely bored most readers (constant thesaurus perusal notwithstanding). 2) A well-trained military does not guarantee stability. See most South American countries. While I have hope it does, there is no empirical evidence that would suggest this is always the case. Opinions are one thing, but to create a mini-thesis without really backing up your argument with any kind of tangible evidence (save for a bike analogy you admit is inadequate) leaves a lot to be desired.

Posted by: Venom at March 07, 2005 10:53 AM (dbxVM)

5 1) You state the obvious when you make the theoretical comment that Iraq will be able to handle itself when it has a population that supports its government and that (in theory) their military will be able to overcome the insurgency once they are better trained. Actually, I said the inverse of that. This and your other comments reveal that you don't really understand the point I'm making, which is not about either an Iraqi or American victory over the insurgency (which is something I assume will happen) but what role that plays in establishing the legitimacy of the regime. Suggest you consult something like a political science dictionary or encyclopedia, and look up the term "legitimacy" or "legitimation." Especially "social legitimation." You might also take a look at Lipset's The First New Nation.

Posted by: Demosophist at March 07, 2005 03:05 PM (Dfdj0)

6 "Actually, I said the inverse of that." Hahaha, that's great...despite the fact that the legitimacy of a government increases quite highly with the support of its population (which can be even higher if said government defeats an insurgency), you're "saying the inverse" of that. And yet trying to play up the logical consequences of this "inverse" at the same time. Very deep and mysterious. "This and your other comments reveal that you don't really understand the point I'm making..." Maybe that means you need to put the thesaurus down? I'm sure most people miss the points you're trying to make on a regular basis. Not because you're smarter and they're dumber, mind you. There's something to be said for concise points that don't meander all over the place. Legitimacy is, obviously, a consequence of a population supporting its government. If a people support their government, regardless of the means that government attained power, it has legitimacy in the eyes of its population. So, no, I didn't miss your point. I just didn't think I needed to "legitimize" your post with any more incredibly obvious analysis. "Suggest you consult something like a political science dictionary or encyclopedia, and look up the term "legitimacy" or "legitimation."" Thanks teach. Will that give me the insightful powers you cast with every verbose-ridden post?

Posted by: Venom at March 07, 2005 03:26 PM (dbxVM)

7 Hahaha, that's great...despite the fact that the legitimacy of a government increases quite highly with the support of its population (which can be even higher if said government defeats an insurgency), you're "saying the inverse" of that. Yeah, without legitimacy it won't have any support, but that's the least of it. The regime simply won't exist for very long. "Support" is simply a matter of having popular policies, and so forth, which has very little to do with this. (That's a matter of administrations, rather than regimes, if you want to get technical.) Conceptually you're not even in the ball park. Anyway, Venon... what makes you think anyone would be much interested in what you have to say (apart from pointing out conceptual errors that might mislead others) since you have a universally negative opinion of everything? It'd be like building a house with a .357.

Posted by: Demosophist at March 07, 2005 05:18 PM (Dfdj0)

8 "without legitimacy it won't have any support, but that's the least of it. " And you say I'm not in the ballpark...you're trying to put the cart before the horse with this statement. Popular support gives legitimacy, not the other way around. Otherwise, Saddam would have had a very legitimate government. But hey, how about I try to keep the illumination of conceptual errors to a minimum? "Anyway, Venon... what makes you think anyone would be much interested in what you have to say since you have a universally negative opinion of everything?" I don't think anyone would care what I have to say. Remember, I'm not at the point where I feel vain enough to have a blog. If you write in a blog, you open yourself to comment and criticism. If you don't like it, don't post. Besides, if you're going to write a monolithic post, you might want to keep in mind who your audience is. At this point, I'd bet that the majority of people who see your name likely skip your posts because your choice of words make even the simplest of issues a tiresome game of "how many big words will Demosophist use this time?" At which point, you have to ask yourself are you writing for the benefit of others or for yourself. I'm guessing the latter. So, why do it publicly? Oh, and I don't have a universally negative opinion of everything. Just when I see things that I think a)need questioning, b)are so inherently stupid, they require comment, or c)are ignorant.

Posted by: Venom at March 07, 2005 06:16 PM (dbxVM)

9 And you say I'm not in the ballpark...you're trying to put the cart before the horse with this statement. Popular support gives legitimacy... I'd bother to explain this to you, but you're such a nasty fellow what's the point? Pupular support is just popular support. It has little to do with social legitimacy. Again, I suppose it's too much to ask you to have enough humility to decide you may not have this topic knocked... but a good starting point is Max Weber. That's not so much for you, because you're pretty much unreachable, but in case anyone else is interested.

Posted by: Demosophist at March 07, 2005 06:59 PM (Dfdj0)

10 Holy smokes, you could split hairs until the cows come home, couldn't you? "It's not this legitimacy, it's that legitimacy." C'mon, it's common sense. Popular support makes all the difference in determining a legitimate government. You trying to dismiss it is pretty closed-minded. Considering that was the basis of your entire "argument" suggests to me you failed. "That's not so much for you, because you're pretty much unreachable, but in case anyone else is interested." lol...I guess you just glossed over my other point in that most people don't read your posts? I'm not really unreachable, unless someone is trying to argue a point they 1)haven't backed up (see your post) or 2)is inherently wrong (see your post). Writing a post that you crafted with every conceivable adjective at your disposal doesn't make your post "right," by the way. It just shows a need to attempt to confuse the writer into thinking you know what you're talking about. By the way, I noticed you completely avoided any defense of my take on your need to write gigantic posts. Maybe I hit the nail on the head? Surely you have the "humility" to realize that?

Posted by: Venom at March 08, 2005 08:50 AM (dbxVM)

11 *...to confuse the READER into thinking...

Posted by: Venom at March 08, 2005 08:52 AM (dbxVM)

12 Venom I think he said "fouls his doorstep". As in dump.

Posted by: Rod Stanton at March 08, 2005 11:54 AM (l5t6M)

13 Could be, Rod (though the "fouls his doorstep" has more flair). Either way, the message is the same.

Posted by: Venom at March 08, 2005 02:27 PM (dbxVM)

14 Holy smokes, you could split hairs until the cows come home, couldn't you? How does your inability to recognize a rather commonplace, standard and obvious distinction become my "ability to split hairs?" Equating "popular support" with political legitimacy is like equating applesaunce with jet fuel, observing that they're both sources of energy. George Washington had enough "popular support" to be elected, but so did Grover Cleveland and Jimmy Carter. The latter contributed precisely nothing to the legitimacy of the nation, while Washington contributed (for all practical purposes) everything. And for all I know Cleveland and Carter got a higher percentage of the vote. Legitimacy isn't popular support. It just looks like it, to the ignorant. Legitimacy is what your parents earned by telling you "no,' when you needed to hear it, which obvioushly wasn't often enough.

Posted by: Demosophist at March 09, 2005 02:15 AM (Dfdj0)

15 See, this is the problem with your argument. You're interpretation of the social legitimacy (or lack thereof) of Jimmy Carter's presidency is simply that: your interpretation. Perhaps your interpretation of social legitimacy is based on whether or not the society in question has engaged in some kind of nation-building (which again opens up the question as to what you actually consider "nation-building"). The "fans" of Jimmy Carter - i.e. the people who voted him in - might argue that his presidency did provide value in a socially legitimate sense. The problem is that you're confusing "identity" for "legitimacy" (oh, and cute comeback you slid in at the end, btw. I'll give you a free pass in the psychoanalysis, but I've got a few theories of mine own regarding your own upbringing). His presidency may not have contributed to the nation's identity in the same sense Washington's did, but is was legitimate in a social sense. If you were to argue that the Iraqis are in danger of losing their new identity without the efforts of the U.S. and its coaltion, I'd agree with you. However, this new country is still going to be socially legitimate with or without the U.S.'s help as long as the majority of Iraqis support whoever is elected. It's them, not you (or the U.S.) who defines the social legitimacy of their country. You're attempting to place your viewpoints (or those you subscribe to) as some kind of blueprint as to whether or not their country will be socially legitimate, while in fact its their perceptions that define what's legitimate or not. Their collective (read: majority) perceptions will define all of this. As such, their popular support plays a far greater role than you wish to admit.

Posted by: Venom at March 09, 2005 10:09 AM (dbxVM)

16 I'm really not going to belabor this topic any more, because you're apparently not even interested enough in learning or comprehension to bother to look up the concept somewhere (like Weber ferinstance). But suffice to say it's not "my definition" that's idiosyncratic, it's yours.

Posted by: Demosophist at March 09, 2005 10:54 AM (Dfdj0)

17 Thank you, because this exchange was becoming as boring as your post. The best part, though, is that you actually didn't prove a thing within your post, and like most wannabe philosophers can't back up shite.

Posted by: Venom at March 10, 2005 10:43 AM (dbxVM)

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